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Abstract—Cloud computing is a revolutionary computing
paradigm which enables flexible, on-demand and low-cost usage
of computing resources. Those advantages, ironically, are the
causes of security and privacy problems, which emerge because
the data owned by different users are stored in some cloud servers
instead of under their own control. To deal with security prob-
lems, various schemes based on the Attribute-Based Encryption
have been proposed recently. However, the privacy problem of
cloud computing is yet to be solved. This paper presents an
anonymous privilege control scheme AnonyControl to address not
only the data privacy problem in a cloud storage, but also the
user identity privacy issues in existing access control schemes.
By using multiple authorities in cloud computing system, our
proposed scheme achieves anonymous cloud data access and fine-
grained privilege control. Our security proof and performance
analysis shows that AnonyControl is both secure and efficient for
cloud computing environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is a new concept of computing technique,
by which computer resources are provided dynamically via
Internet. It attracts considerable attention and interest from
both academia and industry. However, it also has at least three
challenges that must be handled before applied to our real life.
First of all, data confidentiality should be guaranteed. When
sensitive information is stored in cloud servers, which is out of
users’ control in most cases, risks would rise dramatically. The
servers might illegally inspect users’ data and access sensitive
information. On the other hand, unauthorized users may also
be able to intercept someone’s data (e.g. server compromise).
Secondly, personal information (defined by a user’s attributes)
is at risk because one’s identity is authenticated according
to his information. As people are becoming more concerned
about their privacy these days, the privacy-preservability is
very important. Preferably, any authority or server alone
should not know any client’s personal information. Last but
not least, the cloud computing system should be resilient in
the case of security breach in which some part of the system
is compromised by attackers.
In fact, various techniques have been proposed and/or
used to address the aforementioned problems. Identity-based
encryption (IBE) was first introduced by Shamir in 1985 [1].
In the IBE, the sender of a message can specify an identity
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such that only a receiver with matching identity can decrypt
it. This is different from Public-key Encryption, in that the
encrypter does not need to issue extra key to decrypter for
each ciphertext. In the IBE, the private key, which contains
the identity of the holder, is distributed to every user only
once when he joins the systtem.
Few years later, Sahai and Waters proposed a new type
of IBE – Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption [2], which is also
known as Attribute-Based Encryption(ABE). In their work, an
identity is viewed as a set of descriptive attributes. Different
from the IBE, where the decrypter could decrypt the message
if and only if his identity is exactly the same as what specified
by the encrypter, this fuzzy IBE enables the decryption if
there are ‘identity overlaps’ exceeding a pre-set threshold
between the one specified by encrypter and the one belongs
to decrypter. However, this kind of threshold-based scheme
was limited for designing more general system because the
threshold based semantic cannot express a general condition.
Before long, more general tree-based ABE schemes,
Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) [3] and
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [4],
are proposed by Goyal et al. and Bethencourt et al. respec-
tively to overcome the aforementioned drawback of fuzzy IBE.
They look similar, but ciphertext and key structures are totally
different, and the decision of encryption policy (who can or
cannot decrypt the message) is made by different parties.
In the KP-ABE [3], a ciphertext is associated with a
set of attributes, which partially represents the ciphertext’s
encryption policy. A private key is associated with a monotonic
access structure like a tree, which describes this user’s identity
(e.g. IIT AND (Ph.D OR Master)). A user can decrypt the
ciphertext if and only if the access tree in his private key
is satisfied by the attributes in the ciphertext. However, the
encryption policy is described in the keys, so the encrypter
does not have entire control over the encryption policy (who
has access to the data and who does not). He has to trust
that the key generators issue correct keys to correct users.
Furthermore, when a re-encryption occurs, all of the users in
the same system must have their private keys re-issued so as
to gain access to the re-encrypted files, and this process causes
considerable problems in implementation. On the other hand,
those problems and overhead are all solved in the CP-ABE
[4]. In the CP-ABE, ciphertexts are created with an access
structure, which specifies the encryption policy, and private
2keys are generated according to users’ attributes. A user can
decrypt the ciphertext if and only if his attributes in the private
key satisfy the access tree specified in the ciphertext. By
doing so, the encrypter holds the ultimate authority about the
encryption policy. Also, the already issued private keys will
never be modified unless the whole system crashes and the
system’s master key is lost.
In [5], [6], Chase introduced a multi-authority system, where
each user has an ID and they can interact with each key
generator (authority) using different pseudonyms. One user’s
different pseudonyms are tied to his private key, but key
generators never know about the private keys, and thus they are
not able to link multiple pseudonyms belonging to the same
user. In fact they are even not able to distinguish the same
user in different transactions. Also, the whole attributes set
is divided into N disjoint sets and managed by N attributes
authorities. That is, an attribute authority will only issue key
components which it is in charge of. In this setting, even if an
authority successfully guesses a user’s ID, it knows only parts
of the user’s attributes, which are not enough to figure out
the user’s identity. However, the scheme proposed by Chase
et al. [6] considered the basic threshold-based ABE, which
is mentioned at the beginning of this section, and thus lacks
expressibility in terms of encryption policy.
In addition, many similar literature works [7]–[11] have
been published to create more advanced schemes where data
needs to be securely and efficiently protected, which in turn
served as the base of the research on security protocol in
cloud computing environment [12]–[15]. However, much less
effort is paid to protect users’ privacy during those interactive
protocols. Users’ identities, which are described with their
attributes, are generally opened to key generators, and the
generators issue private keys according to their attributes.
But it seems natural that users might want to keep their
identities secret while they still get their private keys. Lewko’s
work [11] is the most similar one to ours in that they also
tried to decentralize the central authority in the CP-ABE into
multiple ones. They use a LSSS matrix as an access structure,
but their scheme only converts the AND, OR gates to the
LSSS matrix while we inherit the flexibility of the access tree
having threshold gates. In addition, our system tolerates the
compromise attack towards attributes authorities, which is not
covered in many existing works.
The main contributions of this paper are:
1) The proposed scheme is able to protect user’s privacy
against each single authority.
2) The proposed scheme is tolerant against authority com-
promise, and compromising of up to (N − 2) authorities
does not bring the whole system down.
3) We provide detailed analysis on security and performance
to show feasibility of our scheme.
4) We first implement the real toolkit of multi-authority
based encryption scheme.
II. PRELIMINARIES & RELATED WORK
A. Preliminaries
Let G0 be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p and
g be its generator. The bilinear map e is defined as follows:
e : G0 × G0 → GT , where GT is the codomain of e. The
bilinear map e has the following properties:
• Bilinearity: ∀u, v ∈ G0 and a, b ∈ Zp, e(ua, vb) =
e(u, v)ab.
• Symmetry: for all u, v ∈ G0, e(u, v) = e(v, u).
• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1.
Definition 1. The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem
in group G0 of prime order p with generator g is defined as
follows: on input g, ga, gb, gc = gab ∈ G0, where a, b, c ∈ Zp,
decide whether c = ab or c is a random element.
Definition 2. The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH)
problem in group G0 of prime order p with generator g is
defined as follows: on input g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G0 and e(g, g)z =
e(g, g)abc ∈ GT , where a, b, c ∈ Zp, decide whether z = abc
or z is a random element.
The security of many ABE schemes (e.g. [4], [14], [16],
[17]) and ours rely on the assumption that no probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms can solve the DDH and DBDH
problem with non-negligible advantage. This assumption is
reasonable since discrete logarithm problems in large number
field are widely considered to be intractable ( [18]–[21]), and
therefore a is not deducible from ga even if g is publicly
known.
We also define the Lagrange coefficient △i,S for i ∈ Zp and
a set, S, of elements in Zp: △i,S(x) :=
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
x−j
i−j , which
will be used in the polynomial interpolation in decryption
algorithm to recover the secretly shared values. Additionally,
a one-way hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G0 is also defined
as a random oracle. This will map any attribute value to a
random element in Zp (same attribute value will be mapped
to the same element).
B. CP-ABE
The idea of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) was first
proposed by Sahai and Waters [2]. On the contrary to the
traditional identity-based encryption, a user is able to decrypt
a ciphertext if there is some match between his private key
and ciphertext in the ABE. However, due to its lack of
expressibility and generalization, it was later extended to the
Key-Policy ABE by Goyal et al. [3] and the Ciphertext-Policy
ABE by Bethencourt et al. [4]. Our scheme chooses CP-ABE
as the base due to its advantages mentioned in the Section I.
In the CP-ABE, the private key is distributed to users by
a trusted central issuer only once. The keys are identified
with a set of descriptive attributes, and the encrypter specifies
an encryption policy using an access tree so that those with
private keys which satisfy it can decrypt the ciphertext.
C. Privilege Trees Tp
In most of previous works [3], [4], [14], encryption policy
is described with a tree called access tree. Each non-leaf node
3of the tree is a threshold gate, and each leaf node is described
by an attribute. One access tree is required in every data file to
define the encryption policy. In this paper, we extend existing
schemes by generalizing the access tree to a privilege tree.
The privilege in our scheme is defined as follows. A data file
has several operations executable on itself, but some of them
should be restricted only to authorized users. For example,
{Read mine, Read all, Delete, Modify, Create} is a privileges
set of students’ grades. Then, reading Alice’s grades is allowed
to her and her professors, but all other privileges should be
authorized only to the professors, so we need to grant the
“Read mine” to Alice and all other to the professors.
Every operation is associated with one privilege p, which is
described by a privilege tree Tp. If a user’s attributes satisfy Tp,
he is granted the privilege p. By doing so, we not only control
the file access but also control other executable operations,
which makes the file controlling fine-grained and thus suitable
for cloud storage service.
In our scheme, several trees are required in every data file to
verify users’ identity and to grant him a privilege accordingly.
There are supposed to be r these kind of structures, which
means there are r different privileges defined for the corre-
sponding data file. The privilege 0 is defined as the privilege
to read the file, and other privileges may be defined arbitrarily
(the mth privilege does not necessarily have more powerful
privilege than the nth one when m > n). The tree is similar
to the one defined in [4]. Given a tree, if numx is the number
of the node x’s children node and kx is its threshold value
0 < kx ≤ numx, then node x is assigned a true value if at least
kx children nodes have been assigned true value. Specially,
the node becomes an OR gate when kx = 1 and an AND gate
when kx = numx.
Several subsidiary functions are to be mentioned for conve-
nience. We denote the parent of a node x by parent(x), and
the attribute value of a leaf node x by att(x). Furthermore,
the privilege tree Tp also defines the order between children
of every node, and the numbers associated with node x, from
1 to numx, are denoted by index(x).
TABLE I
NOTATIONS FOR PRIVILEGE TREES
Tp p
th privilege tree representing the pth privilege
kx threshold value of the node x
numx number of x’s child nodes
att(x) attribute value of the node x, if it is a leaf node
index(x) index of the x’s child nodes
parent(x) node x’s parent node
D. Satisfying the Privilege Tree
If a user’s attributes set S satisfies the privilege tree Tp or the
node x, we define it as Tp(S) = 1 or x(S) = 1 respectively.
Tp(S) is calculated recursively as follows. If x is a leaf node,
x(S) = 1 if and only if att(x) ∈ S. If x is a non-leaf node,
x(S) = 1 only when at least kx child nodes return 1. For the
root node Rp of Tp, Tp(S) = 1 only if Rp(S) = 1.
Figure 1 shows an example of the privilege tree Tp for
deleting the file. For an instance, if a user’s attributes set is
∧
∨∨
Professor Ph.D Chinese American
Fig. 1. An example of a privilege tree.
{Sex:Male, Age:23, Nationality:Chinese, University:Tsinghua
University, Position:Ph.D Student, Religion:None}, he satisfies
the tree, and thus achieving the corresponding privilege (here
it means he can delete the file).
III. DEFINITIONS OF OUR SCHEME
A. System Model
In our system, there are four types of entities: N Attribute
Authorities (denoted as A), Cloud Server, Data Owners and
Data Consumers. A user can be a Data Owner and a Data
Consumer simultaneously.
Data Owner Data 
Consumer
Cloud Servers
2 4
1 3
Outsource
Encrypted File
Do
wn
loa
d
En
cry
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d F
ile
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que
st P
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ic K
ey Request Private Key
N Attribute Authorities
Fig. 2. Our system model
Authorities are assumed to have powerful computation
abilities, who are supervised by government offices since
keys act as IDs and partially contain users’ PII (Personally
Identifiable Information). The whole attribute set is divided
into N disjoint sets and controlled by each authority. One
practical method to divide the attributes set is to divide them
by category (e.g., {Sex: Male, Female}, {Nationality: Korean,
Chinese, Japanese}, {University: Tsinghua, Peking Univer-
sity}, {Position: Professor, Ph.D Student, Master Student}).
In this way, since each authority is aware of only one type
of attribute, no useful information is leaked. The authorities
jointly compute a system-wide public key, and individually
compute their master keys at the initialization phase. The
public key is used for all operations within the system, and
the master keys are used by each attribute authority when he
generates private keys for Data Consumers.
A Data Owner achieves public key from any one of the
authorities, and he uses the public key to encrypt the data
file before outsourcing it to the Cloud Servers. The Cloud
Server, who is assumed to have adequate storage capacity,
does nothing but store them.
Newly joined Data Consumers request private keys from all
of the authorities, and they do not know which attributes are
controlled by the authorities. On the other hand, authorities
do not know which Data Consumers are interacting with them
4because each of them knows only a part of Data Consumers’
attributes. When the Data Consumers request their private keys
from the authorities, authorities jointly create corresponding
private key and send it to them.
All Data Consumers are able to download any of those data
files, but only those whose private keys satisfy the privilege
tree Tp can execute the operation associated with privilege
p. When a user wants to execute a specific operation upon
a data, he should satisfy the relevant privilege tree Tp and
gets verified by the Cloud Server. The server is delegated to
execute an operation p if and only if the user’s privilege is
verified through the privilege tree Tp.
B. Threats Model
We assume the Cloud Servers are untrusted, who behave
properly in most of time but may collude with malicious Data
Consumers or Data Owners to harvest others’ file contents to
gain illegal profits. But they are also assumed to gain legal
benefit when users’ requests are correctly processed, which
means they will follow the protocol in general. In addition,
even if the Cloud Server illegally modifies data files for sake
of monetary benefits (e.g. deleting rarely accessed files to save
the storage), whether the data is intact can be detected by the
TPA technique introduced in [22].
The N authorities are assumed to be semi-honest. That is,
they will follow our proposed protocol in general, but try to
find out as much information as possible individually. More
specifically, we assume they are interested in users’ attributes
to achieve the identities, but they will never collude with
any user or authority to harvest file contents even if it is
highly beneficial. This assumption is similar to many previous
researches on security issue in cloud computing (e.g. [14],
[22]–[24]), and it is also reasonable since these authorities
will be audited by government offices.
Data Consumers are untrustful since they are random users
including attackers. They may collude with other Data Con-
sumers to access what not allowed for them.
C. Design Goal
Our goal is to help Data Owners securely share their data
with Data Consumers, where fine-grained privilege control
is achievable, and to guarantee the confidentiality of Data
Consumers’ identity information by decomposing a center
authority to multiple ones while preserving tolerance to com-
promise attacks on the authorities. We assume the identity
information is not disclosed by the underlying network. This
can be achieved by employing anonymized protocols (e.g.,
[25]).
In the rest of this paper, Au is used to denote the attributes
set of a user u. Ak is used to denote the attribute authority
k, and we also use a subscript k to denote the attributes set
handled by Ak.D. Definition of our Multi-Authority CP-ABE
Setup → PK,MKk:
This algorithm takes nothing as input. Attributes authorities
execute this algorithm to jointly compute a system-wide public
TABLE II
NOTATIONS FOR SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION
Attribute Authorities
k index of an attribute authority
Ak the kth attribute authority
skj secret parameter for compromise tolerance
Data Owner
u a user (either Data Owner or Data Consumer)
A
u attributes set of user u
A
Tp attributes set included in tree Tp
Ke symmetric encryption/decryption key
parameter PK, authority-wide public parameter yk and to
individually compute master keys MKk.
KeyGenerate(PK, MKk, Au, GIDu) → SKu:
This algorithm enables a user to interact with every attribute
authority, and obtains a private key SKu corresponding to
the input attribute set Au and his global ID GIDu. From
the authorities’ perspective, the algorithm enables them to
jointly generate a private key SKu, using the public key
PK and master keys MKk, according to the input Au and
a pseudonym nymGIDu , which is created according to the
GIDu. Authorities are not able to derive a user’s GIDu based
on the pseudonym nymGIDu .
Encrypt(PK, M , {Tp}p∈{0,··· ,r−1}) → (CT,VR):
This algorithm takes as input the public key PK, a message
M , and a set of privilege trees {Tp}p∈{0,··· ,r−1}, where r is
determined by the encrypter. It will encrypt the message M
and returns a ciphertext CT and a verification set VR so that
a user can execute specific operation on the ciphertext if and
only if his attributes satisfy the corresponding privilege tree
Tp. As we defined, T0 stands for the privilege to read the file.
Decrypt(PK, SKu, CT) →M or verification parameter:
This algorithm will be used at file controlling (e.g. reading,
modification, deletion). It takes as input the public key PK,
a ciphertext CT, and a private key SKu, which has a set
of attributes Au and corresponds to its holder’s GIDu. If
the set Au satisfies any tree in the set {Tp}p∈{0,··· ,r−1}, the
algorithm returns a message M or a verification parameter.
If the verification parameter is successfully verified by Cloud
Servers, who use VR to verify it, the operation request will
be processed.
ReEncrypt(PK, CT, SKu, {T ′p}) → CT′,VR′:
This algorithm is barely a composition of the decryption and
the encryption algorithm. It takes as input the public key PK,
a private key SKu, a ciphertext CT, and a set of new privilege
trees {T ′p}p∈{0,··· ,r−1}. If the set Au in SKu satisfies T0 (to
obtain the original message M first) and Tk (privilege k is the
one for re-encryption), the algorithm re-encrypts the original
message M under new set of privilege trees and returns a new
ciphertext CT′ and a new verification set VR′
IV. OUR ANONYCONTROL SCHEME
A. Setup
At the system initialization phase, any one of the authorities
chooses a bilinear group G0 of prime order p with generator
g and publishes it. Then, all authorities independently and
5randomly picks vk ∈ Zp and send Yk = e(g, g)vk to all
other authorities who individually compute Y :=
∏
k∈A Yk =
e(g, g)
∑
k∈A vk
.
Then, every authority Ak randomly picks N − 1 integers
skj ∈ Zp(j ∈ {1, · · · , N}\{k}) and computes gskj . Each gskj
is shared with each other authority Aj An authority Ak , after
receiving N − 1 pieces of gsjk generated by Aj , computes its
secret parameter xk ∈ Zp as follows:
xk = (
∏
j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}
gskj )/(
∏
j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}
gsjk)
= g
(
∑
j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}
skj−
∑
j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}
sjk)
It is easy to see that these randomly produced integers
satisfy
∏
k∈A xk = 1 mod p. This is an important property
which achieves compromise attack tolerance for our scheme,
which will be discussed in the next section.
Then, the master key for the authority Ak is MKk =
{vk, xk}, and public key of the whole system is published
as PK = {G0, g, Y = e(g, g)
∑
vk}.
Note that the time complexity of the setup computation is
O(N2) since every authority computes N − 1 pieces of gskj .
However, this can be further reduced to O(N) by applying the
following simple trick. We first cluster the authorities into C
clusters, and exchanges the parameters within the cluster only.
Then, the time complexity is reduced to O(CN) = O(N)
since C is a constant. Yet, this trick will also relax our
compromise tolerance also. We will further discuss the trade-
off between time complexity and compromise attack tolerance
in the Section V.
B. KeyGenerate(PK, MKk, Au)
When a new user u with GIDu wants to join the system, he
requests the private key from all of the authorities by following
this process which is composed of two phases.
1) Attribute Key Generation: For any attribute i ∈ Au,
every Ak randomly picks ri ∈ Zp to individually compute
the partial private key
H(att(i))ri , D′i = g
ri
Then, all of the authorities randomly picks dk ∈ Zp (dk for
Ak) and compute xk · gvk · gdk and share it with others.
Then, authorities merge the partial private keys by comput-
ing the following: (this can be individually done by any one
of the authorities)
D =
∏
xkg
vkgdk = g
∑
vk+
∑
dk
Di = H(att(i))
ri ·
∏
gdk = H(att(i))ri · g(
∑
dk)
At the end, the D, Di’s and D′i’s are sent to the user u.
2) Key Aggregation: User u, after receiving Di’s and D′i’s,
aggregates the components as his private key:
SKu = {D, ∀i ∈ A
u : Di = g
(
∑
dk) ·H(att(i))ri , D′i = g
ri}
C. Encrypt(PK, M , {Tp}p∈{0,··· ,r−1})
Encryption must be done before Data Owners upload their
data files to the Cloud Server. At first, he randomly selects
a symmetric data encryption key Ke and encrypts the data
file with it using any symmetric encryption scheme (e.g.,
256-bit AES). Then, he determines a set of privilege trees
{Tp}p∈{0,··· ,r−1} and executes Encrypt(PK,Ke, {Tp}). For
each Tp, the algorithm first chooses a polynomial qx for each
node x in it. For each node x, sets the degree dx of the
polynomial qx as one less than the threshold value kx. Starting
from the root node Rp, the algorithm randomly picks sp ∈ Zp
and sets qRp(0) := sp. Then, it chooses other numbers so
that for any other node x, qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)) and
randomly defines the qx too.
Here, Shamir’s secret sharing technique [26] is directly used
to implement the threshold gate. Shamir’s t-out of-n secret
share scheme allows one to divide a secret to n shares, and
the original secret can be recovered with t of them. So, in our
tree, the node value of the gate is recovered if and only if at
least kx values of children nodes are recovered in recursive
manner.
Finally, the ciphertext CT is created as
CT = 〈{Tp}p∈{0,··· ,r−1}, E0 = Ke · Y
s0 ,
{Ci = g
qi(0), C′i = H(att(i))
qi(0)}i∈ATp ,∀p∈{0,··· ,r−1}〉
In the CT above, E0 contains the symmetric key for
decryption, and Ci’s and C′i’s represent the attribute values
in the specified privilege trees.
Then, VR, which is disclosed only to the Cloud Server, is
created for the purpose of privilege verification.
VR = 〈{Ep = Y
sp}p∈{1,··· ,r−1}〉
Finally, Data Owner selects a unique ID for this encrypted
data file and sends CT, VR and the encrypted file to the
Cloud Server to share them with other Data Consumers.
ID CT Encrypted Data File
(a) seen from the data consumers’ perspective.
ID CT Encrypted Data FileVR
(b) seen from the server’s perspective.
Fig. 3. A data file stored on the cloud.
D. Decrypt(PK, SKu, CT)
Every user within the system can download the ci-
phertext from the Cloud Server, but he is able to exe-
cute operations upon encrypted data only after he success-
fully decrypts it. Firstly, we define a recursive algorithm
DecryptNode(CT,SKu, x), where x stands for a node in
the privilege tree Tp. If the node x is a leaf node, we let i be
the attribute of the node x and define as follows. If i ∈ Au,
DecryptNode(CT,SKu, x) =
e(Di,Cx)
e(D′i,C
′
x)
= e(g
∑
dk ·H(att(i))ri ,gqx(0))
e(gri ,H(att(i))qx(0))
= e(g, g)(
∑
dk)·qx(0)
6If not, we define DecryptNode(CT,SKu, x) := ⊥.
If x is not a leaf node, the algorithm proceeds as fol-
lows: For all nodes z that are children of x, it calls
DecryptNode(CT,SKu, z) and stores the output as Fz . Let
Sx be an arbitrary kx-sized set of child nodes z such that
Fz 6= ∅. If no such set exists then the node was not satisfied
and the algorithm returns ⊥. Otherwise, compute
Fx =
∏
z∈Sz
F
△d,s′x
(0)
z , where
{
d = index(z)
S′x = index(z) : z ∈ Sx
=
∏
z∈Sz
(e(g, g)(
∑
dk)·qz(0))△d,S′x (0)
=
∏
z∈Sz
(e(g, g)(
∑
dk)·qparent(z)(d))△d,S′x (0)
=
∏
z∈Sz
(e(g, g)(
∑
dk)·qx(d))△d,S′x(0)
= e(g, g)(
∑
dk)·qx(0) (using polynomial interpolation)
The interpolation above recovers the parent node’s value by
calculating coefficients of the polynomial and evaluating the
p(0). We direct the readers to [26] for complete calculation.
A user recursively calls this algorithm, starting from the root
node Rp of the tree Tp, after downloading the file. If the tree
is satisfied, which means he is granted the privilege p, then
DecryptNode(CT,SKu, Rp) = e(g, g)
sp
∑
dk
Finally, if the user is trying to read the file, the symmetric
encryption key Ke can be recovered by:
E0
e(g,D)
e(g,g)s0
∑
dk
=
Ke · Y
s0
e(g,g
∑
dk+
∑
vk )
e(g,g)
∑
dk
= Ke
Then, the data file can be decrypted by using it. Otherwise, he
should be verified as an authorized user for the operation first.
If the operation requires the jth privilege, the user recursively
calls Decrypt(CT,SKu, x) starting from the root node Rj of
the tree Tj to get e(g, g)sj
∑
dk and further achieve Y sj with
the same equation as above. The user sends it to the Cloud
Server as well as the operation request. The Cloud Server
checks whether Y sj = Ej , and proceeds if they do equal each
other. In fact, Y sj should be encrypted to avoid replay attack.
This can be simply implemented by introducing any public
key encryption protocol.
E. ReEncrypt(PK, CT, SKu, {T ′p}p∈{0,··· ,r−1})
In real applications in a cloud storage system, users might
be revoked due to some reasons (e.g., resignation from a
company). In this case, we need to re-encrypt the files to avoid
unauthorized access by revoked users, the users who satisfy
certain properties for revocation (e.g., resignation). When they
are revoked, they should not access the data files or execute
other operations on them. An authorized user with the privilege
to re-encrypt the associated file (note that this user might not
be limited to the Data Owner) decrypts it first, and randomly
selects another symmetric encryption key K ′e to re-encrypt
it. Then, he determines subtrees which forbid revoked users’
access but still enables other unrelated users’ one, and adds
these subtrees into the original {Tp} to gain new privilege set
{T ′p}. Then, ReEncrypt(PK,CT,SKu, {T ′p}) is executed
to obtain new CT′ and VT′.
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Fig. 4. An example of privilege tree after the re-encryption
Figure.4 shows a new tree T ′p after a re-encryption. As-
suming that there are only three users within the system,
who are described in Figure.4, and the ‘Revoked User’ is
revoked, the subtree may indicate the attribute condition as
(Chinese ∨ Ph.D Student).
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. User’s Identity Information Confidentiality
The attributes, which contain a user’s identity information,
are separately controlled by different attribute authorities.
Therefore, a user’s attributes information is securely protected.
B. Trade-off between Tolerance and Complexity
In the proposed scheme, an authority Ak generates a set
of random secret parameters {skj} and shares it with other
authorities, and the xk is computed based on this parameters.
Even if an adversary is able to compromise up to (N − 2)
authorities, there are still two parameters kept unknown to
the adversary. So, the adversary is not able to guess the valid
g
∑
vk
, and he fails to construct a valid secret key. Hence,
the scheme achieves compromise tolerance to up to (N − 2)
authorities compromise.
But, if we reduce the time complexity of the setup phase by
dividing authorities into several clusters having C authorities
in each, attackers can compromise C−1 authorities in a cluster
to create valid master keys of that cluster. Therefore, there is
a trade-off between tolerance and complexity. However, since
the number of authorities is typically not very huge, and the
setup is one-time operation at the very beginning of the system
setup, we recommend using the original setup algorithm whose
complexity is O(N2).
Finally, note that the compromised authorities are able to
issue valid attribute keys for which they are in charge of, so
the ciphertexts whose privilege trees have only those attributes
might be illegally decrypted if the attacker issue all possible
attribute keys to himself. But, since the authorities are well
protected servers, it is hard to compromise even one authority,
and the probability of compromising enough authorities to
illegally decrypt some ciphertext is very low.
7C. Data Confidentiality against Collusion Attack
In order to access a plaintext, attackers must recover
Y s0 = e(g, g)s0
∑
vk
, which can be recovered only if the
attackers have enough attributes to satisfy the tree T0. When
two different keys’ components are combined, the combined
key cannot go through the polynomial interpolation in the
decryption algorithm due to the randomization. Therefore, at
least one key should be valid to satisfy the privilege tree.
Security Model for AnonyControl construction
W.L.O.G., we assume there is only one privilege tree T0,
which represents the privilege for reading, in the privilege set
of CT. This assumption does not affect the security proof
since we can easily extend the model to have several trees
in CT. Next we show our scheme is secure against chosen
plaintext attacks (CPA) if all probabilistic polynomial-time
adversaries have negligible advantages in this game.
Init The adversary declares a privilege tree T ∗0 , which he
wants to be challenged.
Setup The challenger runs the Setup algorithm of our
construction and publishes PK to the adversary.
Phase 1 The adversary queries for as many private keys,
which correspond to attribute sets A1, · · · ,Aq, as he wants,
where none of these keys satisfy the T ∗0 above.
Challenge The adversary submits two messages M0 and M1
of equal size to the challenger. The challenger flips a random
binary coin b and encrypts Mb with T ∗0 . The ciphertext CT∗
is given to the adversary.
Phase 2 Phase 1 is repeated adaptively.
Guess The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
The advantage of an adversary A in this game is defined as
Pr[b′ = b]− 12 . We note that the model can easily be extended
to handle chosen-ciphertext attacks by allowing for decryption
queries in Phase 1 and Phase 2.
Here we prove that the security of our scheme in the
security model above reduces to the intractability of the DBDH
problem.
Definition 3. Our scheme is secure against CPA if all
polynomial-time adversaries have at most a negligible advan-
tage in the above game.
Theorem V.1. If an adversary can break our scheme in the
security model above, there exists at least one probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm can solve the DBDH problem,
which is defined in the Section III, with a non-negligible
advantage.
Proof: Suppose there exists a probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary A can attack our scheme in the security model
above with advantage ǫ. We prove that the following DBDH
game can be solved with advantage ǫ2 .
Let e : G0 × G0 → GT be a bilinear map, where G0 is
a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p and g is its
generator. First the DBDH challenger flips a binary coin µ, and
he sets (g,A,B,C, Z) := (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) if µ = 0;
otherwise he sets (g,A,B,C, Z) := (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z),
where a, b, c, z ∈ Zp are randomly picked. The challenger
then gives the simulator 〈g,A,B,C, Z〉 = 〈g, ga, gb, gc, Z〉.
The simulator sim then plays the role of a challenger in the
following DBDH game.
Init The adversary A creates a T ∗0 which he wants to be
challenged (Nodes inside the tree should be defined by him).
Setup sim sets the parameter Y := e(A,B) = e(g, g)ab
and gives this public parameter to A.
Phase 1 A queries for as many private keys, which
correspond to attribute sets A1, · · · ,Aq, as he wants, where
none of them satisfy the T ∗0 . sim, after receiving the key
queries, computes the components in private keys to respond
the A’s requests. For all attributes i ∈ Au, he randomly picks
ri ∈ Zp, and computes Di := A · H(att(i))ri , D′i := gri .
Then, sim returns the created private key to A.
Challenge The adversaryA submits two challenge messages
m0 and m1 to the challenger. The challenger flips a binary coin
γ, and returns the following ciphertext to A.
CT
∗ = 〈T ∗0 , E0 = mγ · Z,
{Ci = g
qi(0), C′i = H(att(i))
qi(0)}
i∈AT
∗
0
〉
If µ = 0, Z = e(g, g)abc. If we let ab =
∑
vk and c = s0
(this is possible because vk, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} and s0 are
all randomly chosen from Zp), we have Z = e(g, g)abc =
(e(g, g)ab)c = Y s0 . Therefore, CT∗ is a valid ciphertext of
the message mγ . Otherwise, if µ = 1, Z = e(g, g)z. Then, we
have E0 = mγ · e(g, g)z . Since z ∈ Zp is a random element,
E0 is a random element in GT from A’s perspective, therefore
CT
∗ contains no information about mγ .
Phase 2 Repeat Phase 1 adaptively.
Guess A submits a guess γ′ of γ. If γ′ = γ, sim outputs
µ′ = 0, indicating that it was given a valid DBDH-tuple
(g,A, S, Z), otherwise it outputs µ′ = 1, indicating that he
was given a random 5-element tuple (g,A,B,C, Z).
As shown in the construction of the game, the simulator
sim computes the public parameter and the private key in the
same way as our scheme. When µ = 1, the adversary A learns
no information about γ, so we have Pr[γ 6= γ′|µ = 1] = 12 .
Since the challenger guesses µ′ = 1 when γ = γ′, we
have Pr[µ′ = µ|µ = 1] = 12 . If µ = 0, the adversary A gets
a valid ciphertext of mγ . A’s advantage in this situation is
ǫ by definition, so we have Pr[γ = γ′|µ = 0] = 12 + ǫ. Since
the challenger guesses µ′ = 0 when γ = γ′, we have
Pr[µ′ = µ|µ = 0] = 12 + ǫ. The overall advantage in this
DBDH game is 12Pr[µ
′ = µ|µ = 0] + 12Pr[µ
′ = µ|µ = 1]− 12
= 12 · (
1
2 + ǫ) +
1
2 ·
1
2 −
1
2 =
ǫ
2 .
To conclude, as proved above, the advantage for a
polynomial-time adversary in the DBDH game is ǫ2 if the
advantage for a polynomial-time adversary in our security
model is ǫ. Therefore, if an adversary can break our scheme
in our security model, which indicates ǫ is a non-negligible
advantage, a polynomial-time adversary’s advantage, which is
ǫ
2 , in solving the DBDH problem is also non-negligible.
Since our scheme relies on the assumption that no proba-
bilistic polynomial algorithm can solve the DBDH problem
8TABLE III
COMPLEXITY COMPARISON (PER AUTHORITY)
Process Yu et al. [12] Chase et al. [6] Ours
Setup O(I) O(1) O(1)
Key Generation O(X) O(N + I) O(N + I)
Encryption O(I) O(I) O(X ·K)
Decryption O(max(X, I)) O(N · I) O(X)
User Revocation O(I) O(X ·K)
with non-negligible advantage, it can be deduced that no
adversary can break our scheme in our security model.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we denote N as the number of attribute
authorities, I as the size of the entire attribute set and X as
the number of nodes in a tree Tp.
A. Setup
When the system is setup,
∏
Yk is computed by any one of
the authorities and sent to others, whose complexity is O(N).
Then, secret parameters xk’s are calculated within the clusters.
The complexity of that calculation is O(C2 · N
C
) = O(C ·N),
but C is a constant number, so O(C ·N) = O(N). Therefore,
the total complexity is O(N). However, since we have N
authorities per system, the complexity per authority is O(1).
B. Key Generation
In the Attribute Key Generation, g
∑
vj is computed by
N authorities, and Di = H(att(i))ri · g
∑
vj is computed
for I times by one attribute authority. Therefore, the total
complexity of Attribute Key Generation is O(N2 + I · N).
In the Aggregation of Two Keys, a user aggregates the I
components, thus the computation complexity of this operation
is O(I). So, the complexity per authority is O(N + I).
C. Encryption
At every non-leaf node, a polynomial is chosen and kx − 1
numbers are to be found to determine the polynomial, where
kx is the threshold value. Therefore, denoting the average
threshold value to be K ,the computation complexity of this
process is O(X ·K).
D. Decryption
DecryptNode is a recursive algorithm, and it is executed
exactly once at every nodes in a Breadth-First-Search manner,
therefore the computation complexity of this process is O(X).
E. User Revocation
This operation has the same complexity as the addition of
Decryption and Encryption, thus its complexity is O(X ·K).VII. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we give the experimental result of our
scheme, which is conducted on the prototype of our scheme.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation
of a multi-authority attribute based encryption scheme. Our
prototype system provides five command line tools.
anonyabe-setup : Jointly generates a public key and N
master keys.
anonyabe-keygen : Generates a part of private key for the
attribute set it is responsible for.
anonyabe-enc : Encrypts a file under r privilege trees.
anonyabe-dec : Decrypts a file if possible.
anonyabe-rec : Re-encrypts a file under other privilege trees.
This toolkit is based on the CP-ABE toolkit [4] which
is in turn based on PBC library, and the whole system is
implemented on a linux system with Intel i7 2nd Gen @
2.7GHz and 2GB RAM.
Figure.5 shows the computation overhead incurred in the
core algorithms Setup, Key Generation, Encryption and
Decryption under various conditions.
Figure.5(a) shows the system-wide setup time with different
number of attribute authorities. Figure.5(b) shows the total
key generation time (system-wide) with different number
of authorities, and the number of attributes is fixed to 20.
Figure.5(c) shows the key generation time with different
number of attributes in each key, and the number of authorities
is fixed to 4. Figure5(d) shows the encryption and decryption
time with different number of attributes in T0, and we set
only one privilege for file access to measure the most frequent
operation, file access. Figure.5(e) shows the encryption and
decryption time with different file sizes, where the number of
attributes in T0 is fixed to 20. Figure.5(f) shows the time to
create a privilege tree and calculate a verification parameter
Y sj from it. Obviously, the total time needed to create one
VR is approximately equal to r · t, where r is the number of
total privileges and t is the time for creating one tree.
The Re-encryption is omitted because it is barely a compo-
sition of Decryption and Encryption. Interestingly, in a series
of the experiment, the run time of encryption and decryption
was independent of the tree structure. That is, no matter how
complicated the tree is, the computation complexity of encryp-
tion and decryption depends only on the number of nodes in
the tree, which coincides with the performance analysis table
in the previous section. Results of other algorithms are just as
we expected. The graphs generally followed the growth rate
showed in the performance analysis table above.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed an anonymous attribute-based privilege
control scheme AnonyControl to address the user privacy
problem in a cloud storage server. Using multiple authorities
in the cloud computing system, our proposed scheme achieves
not only fine-grained privilege control, but also anonymity
while conducting privilege control based on users’ identity
information. More importantly, our system can tolerate up
to N − 2 authority compromise, which is highly preferable
especially in Internet-based cloud computing environment.
Furthermore, although the data contents are fully outsourced
to Cloud Servers, the Cloud Servers cannot read the contents
unless their private keys satisfy the privilege tree T0. We also
conducted detailed security and performance analysis which
shows that AnonyControl is both secure and efficient for cloud
storage system.
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Fig. 5. Experiment result on our implemented prototype system
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